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Recent Developments 
Lussier v. Maryland Racing Commission 
I n November, 1996, the Court of Appeals of 
Maryland confronted the issue of 
an administrative agency's 
legislative authority to impose 
sanctions for violations of agency 
regulations in Lussier v. Maryland 
Racing Commission, 343 Md. 681, 
684 A.2d 804 (1996). Following a 
long history of prior cases 
expanding administrative· agen-
cies' powers to include the 
imposition of sanctions, the court 
of appeals upheld the agency's 
legislatively-vested authority to 
impose a penalty on individuals 
who violate that agency's rules, 
regardless of whether an express 
statutory authority for the penalty 
exists. Thus, the court of appeals 
reaffirmed its position that 
administrative officials should be 
given broad discretion in creating 
and enforcing regulations. 
In 1991, Frank P. Lussier 
("Lussier"), a Vermont resident, 
purchased three thoroughbred 
racehorses. Lussier subsequently 
hired Michael Downing 
("Downing"), a New England 
horse trainer, to train and maintain 
the horses. Downing entered 
Lussier's horses in three separate 
$12,000 claiming races at 
Maryland's Laurel Race Course. 
Prior to each race, Lussier 
appeared to sell or transfer the 
horse that was scheduled to run in 
the race to another owner. Lussier 
bet heavily on each horse. In all 
three races, Lussier won. After 
winning, Lussier repurchased the 
horse or transferred the horse back 
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to his trainer. Actual sales of the 
horses, however, were never con-
summated. 
Finding that the Daily Racing 
Form had published the names of 
the new owner or trainer of the 
horse and false workout times for 
each horse prior to each race, the 
Maryland Racing Commission 
("Commission") and the 
Thoroughbred Racing Protective 
Bureau initiated an investigation of 
Lussier and Downing in February, 
1992. Following a hearing, the 
Commission decided that Lussier 
had acted improperly under the 
racing rules set forth in the Code 
of Maryland Regulations and 
therefore was subject to a fine of 
$5,000. Lussier appealed to the 
Circuit Court for Baltimore 
County for judicial review of the 
Commission's order. The circuit 
court upheld the Commission's 
imposition of the fine. Lussier 
then appealed to the Court of 
Special Appeals of Maryland, 
which affirmed the lower court's 
decision. Next, Lussier petitioned 
for certiorari in the Court of 
Appeals of Maryland, and was 
granted certiorari as to the question 
of whether the Commission 
possessed the authority to impose 
a fine for a violation of its 
regulations absent an express 
statutory provision granting the 
power to so fine. 
Maryland courts have con-
sistently upheld broad inter-
pretations of administrative agen-
cies' powers under their enabling 
statutes. Lussier v. Maryland 
Racing Comm 'n, 343 Md. at 
695-96, 684 A.2d at 811. The 
Lussier court followed precedent 
by holding that the Commission 
may impose penalties (i.e. mon-
etary fines) on individuals who 
violated the Commission's 
regulations despite the absence of 
any express statutory authority to 
impose such penalties. In making 
this decision, the court of appeals 
agreed with the court of special 
appeals' analysis of the Com-
mission's legislatively conferred 
powers. Id. at 699, 684 A.2d at 
813. 
Relying on Chapter 273 of the 
Acts of 1920, the court of appeals 
established its basis for declaring 
the Commission's regulation 
imposing a reasonable fine valid. 
Id. at 691-92, 684 A.2d at 809. 
Although this statute does not 
specifically grant the Commission 
power to impose fines, the court 
maintained that an agency's ability 
to act in a particular manner is 
determined by the statutes, legis-
lative history, and policies ap-
plicable to the agency. Id. at 686, 
684 A.2d at 806. The Legislature 
need not specifically authorize the 
27.1 U. Bait. L.F. 71 
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agency's powers. Id. at 686-87, 
684 A.2d at 807. 
According to the court, the 
complexities of modem life pre-
clude government officials from 
becoming experts in all areas. Id. 
at 702, 684 A.2d at 814. Agencies 
must be created to assist govern-
ment in acquiring knowledge and 
understanding of these 
complexities. Id. When establish-
ing these agencies, the Legislature 
often employs broad language in 
the enabling statute due to the void 
in the Legislature's expertise. Id. 
This lack of specificity is intended 
by the Legislature to facilitate the 
administration of laws. Id. (citing 
Sullivan v. Board of License 
Comm'rs, 293 Md. 113, 121,442 
A.2d 558, 563 (1982)). Thus, the 
explicit language of the statute 
does not completely constrain the 
agency's actions. Id. at 686-87, 
684 A.2d at 806-07 (citing Comp-
troller of the Treasury v. 
Washington Restaurant Group, 
Inc., 339 Md. 667, 670-73, 664 
A.2d 899, 901-02 (1995); Holy 
Cross Hospital v. Health Services 
Cost Review Comm 'n, 283 Md. 
677, 686, 393 A.2d 181, 185 
(1978)). 
The court of appeals has 
repeatedly held agency regulations 
valid as long as the regulations did 
not contradict the language and 
intention of the agency's enabling 
statute. Id. at 687-88, 684 A.2d at 
806-07. Furthermore, the court of 
appeals accorded the adminis-
trative interpretation of the statute 
and the legislative response to 
agency enactments great weight. 
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Id. at 688,684 A.2d at 807. 
As the court of appeals held 
that the imposition of a fine is con-
sistent with the legislative intent 
underlying the statute and the 
Commission's statutory authority, 
the Commission may create 
punitive regulations to enforce its 
regulations. Id. at 689-90, 684 
A.2d at 808. This power falls into 
the discretionary void left by the 
Legislature in the statute. Id. at 
691-92, 684 A.2d at 809. The 
Legislature did not intend the 
statute to limit the Commission's 
power and preclude the agency 
from enforcing its regulations. Id. 
at 699-700, 684 A.2d at 813. 
In his dissenting opinion, 
Judge Bell challenged the 
majority'S broad interpretation of 
the statute by arguing that the 
broad discretion accorded to the 
administrative agency is a viola-
tion of the separation of powers 
doctrine. Id. at 707-09, 684 A.2d 
at 817. Judge Bell reasoned that 
agency authority must be limited 
to those powers expressly granted 
in the statute. Id. Thus, statutory 
authority with proper safeguards 
must exist for an agency to impose 
fines. /d. at 708-709, 684 A.2d at 
817. 
An alternative approach, 
alluded to in Judge Bell's dissent 
in delegating authority to an 
agency, is the use of legislative 
oversight and judicial review prior 
to an agency's enactment of a 
punitive regulation. Id. The 
majority supported an uncomp-
licated delegation of authority to 
the agency. 
Administrative agencies are 
created to administer laws, not to 
make laws. Id. at 708-09, 684 
A.2d at 817-18. The creation and 
enactment of laws should be 
undertaken by the public's elected 
officials, not by the elected 
officials' administrative ap-
pointees. Id. Although the courts 
and the Legislature must afford 
some deference to the experts in 
these agencies, the Legislature 
cannot allow these agencies to 
usurp the Legislature's authority to 
promulgate public policy and law. 
Id. at 689, 684 A.2d at 808 (citing 
Fogle v. H & G Restaurant, Inc., 
337 Md. 441, 455, 654 A.2d 449, 
456 (1995)). 
As a result of the court of 
appeals' decision in Lussier to 
interpret administrative agencies' 
enabling statutes broadly, the court 
has empowered the agencies to 
assert greater control over their 
areas of expertise. By allowing 
administrative agencies to attach 
penalties to their regulations, the 
agencies have evolved from 
executive branch departments to 
miniature legislatures and 
judiciaries. The agencies will 
undoubtedly become more intru-
sive in the lives of the citizens of 
Maryland. The citizens of 
Maryland would receive greater 
benefits from broad statutory 
interpretation of agency authority, 
however, if such administrative 
power is coupled with legislative 
oversight and judicial review of 
the enactment of punitive agency 
regulations. 
